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IBP, INC. v. ALVAREZ ANDABDELA TUMv. BARBER 
FOODS, INC.-REVISITING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE 
PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT. 
by 
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM* 
The Portal-to-Portal Act of 194 71 is the federal statute that 
places limits on the types of employee activities that are 
compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA).2 Although the activities covered by this law may only 
involve a few minutes in a worker's day, mischaracterizing 
whether those activities are compensable under the FLSA or 
noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act can result in 
significant monetary consequences for both the employee and 
the employer. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered 
the question of what constitutes compensable time in the 
consolidated cases of IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, et al. and Abdela 
Tum, et al. v. Barber Foods, Inc. 3 The issue before the court 
was whether an employer is exempt under the Portal-to-Portal 
Act from paying for three types of employee activities: the 
time that an employee spends waiting to receive protective gear 
that must be worn at the worksite, the time that it takes to don 
and doff that protective gear, and the time it takes to walk 
between the place where the gear is donned and doffed and the 
production area. The court concluded that even though the 
statutory workday does not include the waiting time, it 
certainly includes the donning, doffing, and traveling time 
when those activities are "integral and indispensable" to the 
"principal activity" of the employee's work. 
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies m Business, Iona 
College, New Rochelle, New York. 
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Congress originally enacted the FLSA in response to a 
general finding that labor conditions in the 1930s were 
"detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-
being ofworkers."4 Two key provisions of the statute require 
employers to pay workers a minimum wage5 and to prohibit 
them from employing workers in excess of 40 hours per week 
unless the workers receive overtime compensation at a rate not 
less than one and one-halftimes the regular rate ofpay.6 
Although §203 defines many of the terms used in the FLSA, it 
fails to define two significant ones--"work" and "workweek." 
The U.S. Supreme Court made up for this omission in a series 
of 1940's decisions that interpreted those terms not only in 
the context of the standard definitions found in Webster's 
Dictionary but also in light of the remedial purposes of the 
FLSA. In the first case, Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. 
Muscoda Local No. 123,7 the court held that for statutory 
purposes "work or employment" included "physical or mental 
exertion (whether burdensome or not) 
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily 
and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his 
business."8 Later that same year, in the case of Armour & Co. 
v. Wantock et al} the court clarified its definition of "work" by 
noting that "exertion" on the part of the employee is not 
necessary if the employer has hired the employee "to do 
nothing, or to do nothing but to wait until something 
happens."10 Two years later, in the case of Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co. , 11 the court expanded the meaning of 
"statutory workweek" to include "all time during which an 
employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's 
premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace."12 That meant 
that employers had to compensate employees for the time spent 
walking between the time clocks at the factory entrance and the 
employees' actual workstations as well as for time required to 
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complete a variety of preliminary work activities.13 The 
Anderson decision prompted a more employer-sympathetic 
Congress to amend the FLSA through the passage of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947. 
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act out of a concern 
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the terms "work" 
and "workweek" superseded "long-established customs, 
practices, and contracts between employers and employees, 
thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in 
amount and retroactive in operation."14 The Portal-to-Portal 
Act addressed the employers' concerns by creating statutory 
remedies that were intended to apply retroactively as well as 
prospectively. Under Part II, §2 of the Act, (entitled "Relief 
from Existing Claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act"), an 
employer was no longer be liable for claims filed prior to the 
enactment of the statute so long as those claims arose from 
activities that were neither compensable under an express 
contract nor an established custom or practice.15 In addition, 
under Part III, §4, (entitled "Relief for Certain Future Claims 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act"), an employer would not 
have to compensate employees for any time spent going to and 
from the actual place where the principal employment activities 
were performed or for any time devoted to activities that are 
preliminary to or postliminary to the workers' principal 
0 0 0 16 employment acttvtttes. 
Soon after Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, the 
Department of Labor issued regulations limiting the scope of 
the new law. Both 29 C.F.R. §790.6(a) and §790.6(b) provided 
guidance on how to calculate compensable hours. According 
to §790.6(a), the computation of FLSA compensable hours was 
not changed by the terms of the Portal-to-Portal Act so long as 
the time claimed was "within" the workday.17 Section 
790.6(b) went on to endorse a "continuous workday rule" that 
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measured the workday as "the period between the 
commencement and completion on the same workday of an 
employee's principal activity or activities." 18 When read 
together, the two regulations supported the conclusion that 
under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act, an activity was a 
compensable "workday" activity if it occurred within "the 
continuous workday." 
The U.S. Supreme Court further restricted the impact of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act in its decision in the case of Steiner v. 
Mitchell. 19 The key to that case was the recognition of a 
distinction between employee activities that were "preliminary 
and postliminary" to the workday and employee activities that 
were "preparatory and concluding" but still within the 
workday. The court's ruling that the employees at the battery 
factory had a statutory right to be compensated for the time 
they spent changing their clothes at the beginning of the shift 
and showering at the end of the shift was based on two 
important factual findings. The first was that the employees 
worked with dangerously caustic and toxic materials. The 
second was that they were required, for public health and 
safety reasons, to change their clothes and shower before they 
could leave the workplace. The court noted that there was a 
substantial difference between employees changing and 
showering at the end of work under normal conditions and their 
changing and showering as a result of health and safety risks 
associated with the production of batteries. That difference 
meant that the latter could be classified as activities that are an 
"integral and indispensable part of the principal activities." The 
court went on to conclude "that activities performed either 
before or after the regular shift work, on or off the production 
line, are compensable under the portal-to-portal provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act if those activities are an integral 
and indispensable part of the principal activities for which the 
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covered workmen are employed and are not specifically 
excluded by §4(a)(l ). "20 
The Steiner decision acknowledged that the Portal-to-Portal 
Act was the consequence of a negative Congressional reaction 
to the Anderson case. The court also admitted that it had 
experienced difficulty in trying to understand some of the 
provisions of the new act. While the purpose of §2 was clearly 
to limit an employer's liability for unexpected wages based on 
activities occurring before 194 7, the purpose of other sections 
was much less obvious. The court found it necessary to review 
the legislative history- and especially that of the Senate--in 
order to untangle the statutory ambiguity. Much of the court's 
inquiry was directed at understanding the meaning of the 
phrase "principal activity or activities" as it was used in §4.21 
In the end, the court concluded that "while Congress intended 
to outlaw claims prior to 194 7 for wages based on all employee 
activities unless provided for by contract or custom of the 
industry, including, of course, activities performed before or 
after regular hours of work, it did not intend to deprive 
employees of benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act where 
they are an integral part of and indispensable to their principal 
activities.'m Consequently, whether an employer had to 
compensate an employee for work that had been performed 
before or after the regular work shift and on or off the 
production line depended on whether those activities were an 
"integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for 
which the person was employed" as opposed to being 
"preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or 
activities." 
Nearly fifty years after Steiner, the Supreme Court agreed to 
reconsider the question of the FLSA compensability in two 
new donning and doffing cases. The primary difference 
between the Steiner case and the consolidated cases of JBP and 
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Barber Foods was that the issue was no longer whether 
donning and doffing of mandatory protective gear was 
compensable. The new focus was on the issue of whether two 
employee activities--the time spent waiting to collect the 
protective gear and the time spent either walking to a work site 
after donning the gear or walking from the work site to the area 
where the gear is doffed--are integral and indispensable to the 
employee's work and, therefore, compensable. 
II. 
The IBP and Barber Foods cases both involved FLSA 
claims by workers employed in the food processing industry. 
IBP, Inc. , the world's largest producer of fresh beef, pork, and 
related products, operates a "kill and processing plant" in 
Pasco, Washington. At the time of the lawsuit, the employees 
at the Pasco plant included approximately 178 workers in the 
slaughter division and 800 line workers in the processing 
division. All of the production workers in both divisions were 
required to wear sanitary outer garments, hardhats, haimets, 
earplugs, gloves, sleeves, aprons, leggings, and boots. Others, 
including those who worked with knives, also had to wear 
protective equipment including chain link metal aprons, vests, 
plexiglass armguards, and special gloves. When the protective 
gear was not being use, it had to be stored in locker rooms at 
the plant. 23 
The production line workers at the Pasco plant were covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement that required them to be 
at their workstations and prepared to work from the moment 
the first piece of meat came across the production line. Prior to 
arriving at their workstations, the employers had to gather their 
assigned equipment, don that equipment in the locker rooms, 
and prepare work-related tools. It was only when these tasks 
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were completed that the employees could walk to the slaughter 
or processing floors. If employees needed to visit the cafeteria 
or restrooms during their unpaid thirty-minute meal break, they 
were required to remove the outer garments, protective gear, 
gloves, scabbards, and chains. (It was the company's policy 
that any time needed to doff and don the equipment had to be 
completed during the break time.) Finally, at the end of each 
workday, the workers were required to clean, restore, and . . 24 return their equipment to the appropnate on site storage area. 
Although the IBP workers were required to use a 
computerized "swipe card" system when they arrived at 
left the plant, they were not paid based on the data from their 
individual swipe cards. Pay was based, instead, on a "gang 
time pay" model. Under such a plan, workers only received 
compensation for the actual time that all of the were 
actually cutting and bagging meat. Compensable time 
with the processing of the first piece of meat and ended with 
the processing of the last piece of meat. As a result, 
were not paid for the time it took to don and doff the protective 
gear or for the time needed to walk between the locker rooms 
and production floor at the beginning and end of the work 
shifts.25 
The second of the two consolidated cases involved a claim, 
which was filed against Barber Foods, Inc. , by some of the 300 
hourly wageworkers at its Portland, Maine plant. . 
employees, who were divided between two shifts With SIX 
production lines each, worked in the secondary processing of 
poultry-based products. The poultry products, which were 
assembled on three specialty production lines, were pouched, 
packed, and palletized on three pack-out production lines. The 
production workers included the rotating associates (who 
rotated to different positions every few hours), the set-up 
operators (who maintained the various machines on the lines), 
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the meat room associates (who blended the raw products with 
the ingredients), the shipping and receiving associates, the 
maintenance workers, and the sanitation workers.26 All of the 
production workers were required to wear certain kinds of 
protective gear that had to be donned before the workers 
punched in and doffed after they punched out. The required 
gear included lab coats, hairnets, and earplugs for the rotating 
associates;27 lab coats, hairnets, earplugs, safety glasses, steel-
toed boots, bump hats, back belts, and lock-out/tag out 
equipment for the set-up operators; lab coats, hairnets, 
earplugs, safety glasses, steel-toed boots, and back belts for 
meatroom associates;28 and steel-toed boots, hard hats, and 
back belts for shipping and receiving associates. 29 
Barber Foods provided the mandatory equipment to the 
employees. Some items, such as the bump hats, back belts, 
safety glasses, steel-toed boots, and reusable earplugs that were 
given to the workers on a one-time basis and replaced only as 
needed, could be stored either in the workers' lockers or at 
their homes. The rest of the items had to be picked up and 
returned to a variety of locations in the plant by the employees 
each day.30 It was only after the workers have waited for, 
collected, and donned their equipment that they were allowed 
to punch in at their designated computerized time clocks.31 
Employees were paid from the moment that they punched in 
until the moment that they punched out. In addition, the 
company had a twelve minute "swing time" that allowed an 
employee to punch in up to six minutes early and get paid for 
that time or punch out up to six minutes late without being 
charged with an attendance violation. 
III. 
The IBP and Barber Foods cases, which were both filed in 
federal courts, presented similar, though not identical , claims 
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under the FLSA. Both sets of plaintiffs asserted that their 
employers had violated the FLSA when they failed to 
compensate the workers for the time spent donning and doffing 
the protective gear and for the time spent walking between 
locker rooms and the production floors of the processmg 
facilities. In addition, the employees in Barber Foods claimed 
compensation for the time they had spent waiting to receive 
their protective gear. 
a. Alvarez v. IBP. 
The JBP class action case was originally filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District ofWashington.32 After a 
twenty-day bench trial, Judge Robert H. Whaley concluded that 
the employer were obliged, under the terms of the FLSA, to 
compensate the workers for the time they spent donning and 
doffing protective gear that was unique to a particular job since 
that time was integral and indispensable to the work of the 
employees. In addition, employees, who required 
and doff unique protective gear, had to be paid for the time It 
took them to walk between the locker room and the production 
area since those activities occurred during the continuous 
workday. On the other hand, employees were not be entitled to 
be paid for the time they had spent in ordinary clothes 
changing and washing or for the donning and doffmg of a hard 
hat, ear plugs, safety glasses, boots, or a hairnet. 
The JBP case was appealed to a three-judge panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.33 In response to 
the threshold question of whether the donning and doffing and 
waiting and walking constituted "work" under the FLSA," the 
appellate court answered in the affirmative.34 The court then 
considered whether the activities, which were preliminary and 
postliminary to the principal activity of the job, were, if fact, 
"an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities" 
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and, therefore, not covered by §4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
Noting that the Supreme Court had adopted a context-specific 
approach in deciding whether an activity was integral and 
indispensable to a principal activity, the Ninth Circuit 
evaluated the activities in question to determine if they were 
both necessary to the principal work performed and done for 
the benefit of IBP.35 Since federal law (including the 
sanitation standards of the Department of Agriculture and the 
industry standards of the Occupational Safety and Health), 
IBP's own internal rules, and the nature of the work all 
required the plaintiffs to don and doff specific gear, the 
appellate court concluded that the activities were "necessary" 
to the "principal" work performed. The fact that the workers 
had to use the protective gear in order to prevent unnecessary 
workplace injury and contamination (which would impede 
work on the production line) also supported the trial court's 
conclusion that the donning, doffing, and cleaning activities 
were for the benefit of the employer.36 
The Court of Appeals distinguished between the donning, 
doffing, and cleaning of unique protective gear (such as Kevlar 
gloves) and non-unique gear (such as hard-hats and safety 
glasses). While the court concluded that both types of gear 
were necessary for the performance of the principal work (and 
as such could fall under the Steiner exception), it denied 
compensation for the time spent donning and doffing the non-
unique gear on the grounds that that time was de minimis as a 
matter oflaw.37 
IBP had also argued that 29 U.S.C. §203(o), (hereinafter 
referred to as §3(o)), provided a statutory basis for denying 
compensation to workers for the time spent donning and 
doffing their gear. Section 3( o) of the FLSA excluded from 
compensable time "any time spent in changing clothes or 
washing at the beginning and end of each workday which was 
2007 I IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 62 
excluded from measuring working time during the week 
involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice 
under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable 
to the particular employee." The Circuit Court rejected IBP's 
expansive understanding of the phrase "changing clothes." It 
reasoned that since there was no statutory clarification, 
legislative history, or case law to help explain the meaning of 
the phrase, it had no choice but to give the words their 
. . ,38 Th t t "ordmary, contemporary, common meanmg. a mean 
that the protective gear that had been worn by IBP's workers 
and that certainly had been different from typical clothing, did 
not "plainly and unmistakably" fit within the statute's meaning 
of word "clothing". This conclusion was supported by 
reference to an OSHA regulation that had made a similar 
analytical distinction between "seneral work clothes" and 
"personal protective equipment." 9 Consequently, the court 
held that the §3(o) exemption did not apply in this instance.40 
The employer was equally unsuccessful in its assertion that 
the District Court erred in its determination of what constituted 
a compensable workday. IBP suggested that §4(a)(l) of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act was a "stand alone" provision that had to 
be read to exclude compensation for any and all ''walking, 
riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance 
of the principal activity."4 1 As such, IBP argued that even if it 
had to pay its employees for the time spent donning and 
doffing the protective gear, it certainly did not have to 
compensate them for the time spent walking between the 
locker rooms and their workstations. According to IBP, the 
compensable workday was made up of the sum of a number of 
discrete periods-the time spent donning and doffing of the 
gear and the time spent at the workstation- but not the time 
spent walking to the worksite or the principal activity. The 
Court of Appeals rejected IBP's arguments and affirmed the 
trial judge's view that the compensable workday began with 
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the first act of compensable work and did not end until the last 
act of compensable work was completed. Since the trial court 
had determined that the first act of compensable work had been 
the preliminary donning of the protective gear and that the last 
act had been the returning to the changing areas and doffing the 
gear and since it had also determined that both activities were 
"integral and indispensable" to the principal work activities, 
the court did not err in holding that the workday included the 
reasonable time spent walking between the locker rooms and 
the workstations. 
b. Abdela Tum, et al. v. Barber Foods, Inc. 
The Barber Foods case, which was filed in the federal court 
in Maine,42 was originally presented to a federal magistrate, 
who recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant. In the first of two critical rulings, the magistrate 
held that the time spent donning and doffing clothing and 
equipment was compensable (and not excluded as preliminary 
and postliminary activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act) if the 
activities had been mandated by the employer or by the 
government. Employees, on the other hand, were not entitled 
to compensation for the time it took them to don and doff 
clothing and equipment that they were not required to use.43 
The second ruling rejected the claim that the employer had to 
pay workers for the time they had spent waiting to obtain 
mandated gear since these activities could not reasonably be 
construed to be an integral part of the employees' work 
activities.44 The magistrate concluded by recommending that a 
summary judgment be entered denying the claims relating to 
the time each employee spent walking from the entrance of the 
plant to the employee's workstation, locker, time clock or site 
where the required clothing and equipment were distributed 
and for claims based on the time spent waiting to punch in or 
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out for that clothing and equipment.45 What the magistrate did 
not consider was the applicability of §4 of the Portal-to-Portal 
Act to the time spent walking between the place of donning 
and doffing and the production line.46 
When the case was presented to the trial court, Judge Gene 
Carter followed the recommendation of the magistrate and 
granted the partial summary judgment in favor of Barber 
Foods. The only unresolved issue involved Barber Foods' 
alleged liability for the time its employees spent donning and 
doffing various gear. Prior to submitting the case to the jury, 
the parties stipulated that four categories of workers (the 
rotating, set-up, meatroom, and shipping and receiving 
associates) had been required to don and doff protective gear at 
the beginning and end of their shifts. The instructions to the 
jury asked for a specific set of factual findings. The first 
required the jury to determine how much time was reasonably 
needed to don and doff the gear. The second asked whether 
that time had been de mzmm1s and, consequently, 
noncompensable. The jury ultimately concluded that in each 
case the time had m fact been de minimis and 
noncompensable. 47 
Both parties appealed the decisions of the lower court to a 
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.48 The employees claimed that the lower court had 
erred when it granted the partial summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants and when it instructed the jury. The employer, 
in a cross-appeal, objected to the lower court's ruling that the 
donning and doffing of required clothing and equipment had 
been an integral part of the employees' work and, as such, had 
not qualified as noncompensable preliminary and postliminiary 
activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
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The appellate court's de novo review of the lower court's 
granting of a partial summary judgment focused on two issues. 
The first was whether the trial court had erred in denying the 
employers compensatioin for the time spent going from place 
to place to collect different pieces of required clothing and 
gear, for the time spent walking from where those items were 
received to the time clocks, and for the time spent doffing and 
disposing of the items at the end of the day. The second issue 
was whether the court had erred in denying the employees 
compensation for the time they had spent waiting in line to 
collect the required gear and to punch in at the time clocks. 
The three-judge panel affirmed the trial court's denial of 
compensation for walking time. It found support for the lower 
court's decision in 29 C.F.R. §790.7(g) n.49, which provided 
that even though the changing of clothes may in "certain 
situations be so directly related to the specific work the 
employee is employed to perform that it would be regarded as 
an integral part of the employee's ' principal activity[,]' this 
does not necessarily mean, however, that travel between the 
washroom or clothes-changing place and the actual place of 
performance of the specific work the employee is employed to 
perform, would be excluded from the type of travel to which 
the section 4(a) [Portal-to-Portal Act] refers."49 The appellate 
court further stated that even if it had assumed, for the sake of 
argument, that employees had been engaged in an integral and 
indispensable part of their principal employee activities when 
they donned and doffed mandated gear, their walking time 
would still be noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 5° 
Just because the traditional understanding of a primary activity 
had been stretched to cover donning and doffing in a very 
limited number of cases did not mean that Congress intended to 
create an avenue to circumvent the Portal-to-Portal Act's 
exemption of preliminary and postliminary activities.51 The 
panel then referred to 29 C.F.R. §790.7 to determine whether 
2007 I JBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 66 
the walking in this case had merely been a "preliminary or 
postliminary" activity. After differentiating the facts in this 
case from the examples listed in the federal regulation, the 
court found that the time that had been spent walking from 
place to place to gather ordinary safety gear and to punch in 
"[fell] outside of the narrow category of walking that [was} 
"not segreable from the simultaneous performance of [their] 
. d k ,,52 asstgne wor . 
The appellate court also rejected both of the employees' 
claims that they should have been compensated for the time 
that they spent waiting to punch in and waiting to collect the 
required clothing or gear. The panel found no persuasive 
argument to depart from the general rule, articulated in 29 
C.F.R §790.8 (c) n. 67, that states that even when changing 
clothes has been considered to be a principal activity, 
"activities such as checking in and out and waiting in line to do 
so would not ordinarily be as integral parts of the 
principal activity or activities." 3 The panel similarly rejected 
the employees' claim that they should have been compensated 
for the time they had spent waiting to collect the required gear 
after noting that 29 C.F.R. §790.8 states that a reasonable 
amount of time was intended to be preliminary and 
postliminary- and noncompensable. 54 
The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs' request for a 
rehearing and reaffirmed the decision of the district court and 
the three-judge pane1.55 The court began by agreeing that the 
donning and doffing of gear was only an integral and 
indispensable part of an employee ' s principal activities when 
the employer or government had mandated the use of the gear. 
It went on to reject the employees ' claims that they should 
have been compensated for any walking time that occurred 
between when the employees picked up their first piece of 
required gear and when they returned the gear at the end of the 
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shift. This conclusion was based on the court's understanding 
of29 C.F.R. § 790.7(g) n. 49 and a narrower understanding of 
the term "workday".56 The issue ofwhether employees should 
be compensated for waiting in line to receive mandated gear 
and to punch in at the time clocks was also decided in favor of 
the employer. The court characterized this as a classic FLSA 
case of "waiting to be engaged" and not as a case of "engaged 
to wait." It went on to note that even if the waiting time 
qualified as "engaged to wait" time, it would not be 
compensable since it also constitutes a preliminary or 
postliminary activity that is noncompensable under the Portal-
to-Portal Act.57 Finally, the court rejected both the employer's 
cross-appeal (on the grounds that a party cannot appeal a 
favorable judgment merely to obtain the review of a finding it 
deems erroneous) and the employee's objection to the jury 
instructions (on the grounds that the instructions were correct 
and did not confuse or mislead the jury.)58 
IV. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to the 
consolidated cases of IBP and Barber Foods in order to resolve 
the differences between the lower courts on two questions. 
The first question was whether the FLSA required the 
employer to pay an employee for postdonning and predoffing 
walking time. The second question, which had only been 
raised in the Barber Foods case, was whether the FLSA also 
required the employer to compensate an employee for the time 
spent waiting to collect the protective gear. The court's 
opinion, which was delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
held that an employer was required to compensate employees 
for the time they spent walking between changing and 
production areas when the donning and doffing of required 
gear was "integral and indispensable" to the workers' 
"principal activities ." Under the continuous workday rule, the 
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workday began when the required gear was donned and 
continued uninterrupted until the gear was finally doffed. 
Since the time spent waiting to receive and don the first piece 
of gear was more properly characterized as a "preliminary" 
activity, it was not compensable under the terms of the Portal-
to-Portal Act. 
The court's unanimous decision began with a summary of 
the legislative history of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act 
and with a review of the judicial interpretation of the statutes. 
Particular attention was paid to §4(a) of the law, which had 
narrowed the scope of future FLSA claims. The court conceded 
that §4(a) had nullified previous judicial decisions that had 
allowed compensation to employees both for the time spent on 
the employer's premises walking to and from the actual place 
where the employees' principal activities were performed and 
for the time spent performing activities that were "preliminary 
or postliminary" to the employees' principal activities.59 On 
the other hand, the court found that, except for those two types 
of activities, the Portal-to-Portal Act had not altered the judicial 
interpretation of the terms "work" and "workday" nor had it 
provided an alternative definition for the term "workday."60 It 
also noted that the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor 
after the passage of the legislation indicated that the statute had 
had no effect on the computation of hours worked within the 
'workday' proper (29 C.F.R. §790.6(a))61 and that it had not 
changed the continuous workday regulation that defined the 
workday as the "period of time between the commencement 
and completion on the same workday of an em£1oyee's 
principal activity or activities" (29 C.F.R. §790.6(b). 2 The 
court concluded the first part of its decision by reaffirming its 
holding in Steiner that the time spent in activities such as the 
donning and doffing of specialized protective gear was 
compensable if the activities were an "integral and 
indispensable part of the principal activities."63 
69 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
IBP 's appeal was based on its belief that §4(a)(l) of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act excluded FLSA compensation for the time 
spent walking between the locker rooms and the production 
areas. IBP did not challenge the lower court's finding that the 
donning and doffin¥ of protective gear were compensable 
activities under §4.6 It tried instead to differentiate between 
the category of "integral and indispensable" activities that 
might be compensible because they are not merely preliminary 
or postliminary within the meaning of §4(a)(2)" and the 
category of actual "principal activities" which the employee 
was "employed to perform" within the meaning of §4(a)(l). 
Activities that were "integral and indispensable" to the 
"principal activities" of the employee were covered by the 
FLSA and not excluded by §4(a)(2). That did not, however, 
mean that the "integral and indispensable" activities were 
themselves "principal activities" as defined by §4(a)(l). The 
significance of this distinction was that while "integral and 
indispensable" activities might be compensable, only 
"principle activities" could trigger the beginning of the 
compensable workday. 
IBP's attempt to claim two different meanings for the 
phrase "principal activities" under §4(a)(l) and §4(a)(2) of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act was rejected by the Supreme Court. 
Justice Stevens, referring to the Steiner case, noted that when 
activities were "integral and indispensable" to "principal 
activities," they were not excluded from FLSA coverage by §4 
of the Portal-to-Portal Act precisely because they were 
themselves "principal activities."65 Although the court 
acknowledged that Steiner decision had only been concerned 
with the meaning of "principal activity or activities" under 
§4(a)(2), it presented two reasons why that meaning was also 
applicable to §4(a)(l). The first was a matter of normal 
statutory interpretation-identical words used in different parts 
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of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same 
meaning.66 The second was that the "said principal activity or 
activities" referred to in §4(a)(2) was an explicit reference to 
67 I . d the use of the same term in §4(a)(l). The court a so reJecte 
IBP's assertion that some activities may be sufficiently 
"principal" to be compensable, but not sufficiently 
to commence the workday. It concluded instead that whtle 
walking to the locker room to don special safety gear would be 
noncompensable time under §4(a)(l), walking from the locker 
room after donning the special safety gear would be 
compensable §4(a)(l) since the locker _had the 
relevant "place of performance" of the
6
pnnctpal activity that 
the employee was employed to perform. 
In addition to presenting arguments based on the text of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, IBP also suggested that the court should 
construe the statute in a way that would effectuate the real 
purpose for which it was _enacted. IBP claimed that t?ere a 
proximate cause connection between Supreme Court s 
in the Anderson case (in which the court granted compensatiOn 
for the time employees spent walking from the punch in clock 
to the actual workstation) and the passage of the Portal-to-
Portal Act (in which Congress excluded from compensation the 
time spent walking to and from the actual place of performance 
of the principal activity or activities which the employees had 
been employed to perform). The court rejected this line of 
reasoning on the grounds that there was a crucial 
between the walking in the Anderson case and the walkmg m 
the IBP case. In the former, the walking occurred before the 
workday began whereas in the latter, the walking did not occur 
' 69 until the workday had already begun. 
The court also considered the impact of a number of 
regulations, which had been adopted by the Secretary of Labor 
shortly after the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The 
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regulations not only supported the employees' view that the 
donning and doffing of protective gear were compensable 
activities but they also defined the outer limits of the workday. 
Both 29 C.F.R. §790.7(c) and §785.38 suggested that the time 
spent walking between a locker room and a production area 
was similar to the compensable time spent walking between 
different workplaces on the disassembly line.70 The court 
noted that while 29 C.F.R. §790.6, measured the limits of most 
workdays as "roughly the period 'from whistle to whistle,'" 29 
C.F .R. § 790.6(b) stated that the term "workday" had also been 
used in the Portal-to-Portal Act to mean, "in general, the period 
between the commencement and completion on the same 
workday of an employee's principal activity or activities."71 
Finally, the court agreed with IBP's claim that, under 29 C.F.R. 
§790.7(g), n. 49, the postchanging walking time was not 
"necessarily" excluded from the scope of §4(a)(l).72 That, 
however, did not help IBP's case since the fact that the activity 
was not "necessarily" excluded did not mean that it was always 
excluded and since the ambiguity in the regulation's note did 
not overcome the meaning of the statute, as it had been 
resolved in the Steiner decision.73 Justice Stevens summarized 
the court's holding in the IBP case by stating that if an 
employee's activity was "integral and indispensable" to a 
"principal activity," it was itself a "principal activity" under 
§4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
b. Barber Foods, Inc. 
It was only after resolving the issues in the IBP case that the 
Supreme Court considered the one unique issue in the Barber 
Foods case: whether the time that had been spent waiting to 
obtain mandatory clothing and equipment was compensable.74 
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The employees claimed that the waiting time was ""integral 
and indispensable" to the "principal activity" of donning, and 
was therefore itself a principal activity."75 The employer, on 
the other hand, took the position that the waiting time qualified 
as a "preliminary or postliminary activity" that was explicitly 
covered by §4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The court 
based its decision in favor of the employer on the distinction it 
drew between the time spent donning mandatory gear, "which 
was always essential if the worker is to do his job," and the 
time spent waiting to receive the gear, which "may or may not 
be necessary in particular situations or for every employee."76 
Although the waiting time was certainly a "preliminary" 
activity, it was not an activity that was "integral and 
indispensable" to a "principal activity." The conclusion that 
there was a difference between preshift activities that were 
"necessary" to a principal activity and preshift activities that 
were "integral and indispensable" to a principal activity was 
based on an understanding that the waiting time was analogous 
to the kind of walking time, which the court had found to be 
compensable in the Anderson case and which Congress had 
repudiated in the Portal-to-Portal Act.77 
The court also rejected a claim that had been presented by 
the government in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the 
employees. The government claimed that, under 29 C.F .R. 
§790.7(h), when an employee "is required by his employer to 
report at a particular hour at his workbench or other place 
where he performs his principal activity, if the employee is 
there at that hour ready and willing to work but for some 
reason beyond his control there is no work for him to perform 
until some time has elapsed, waiting for the work would be an 
integral part of the employee's principal activities." The 
problem with trying to apply this waiting to work regulation to 
the Barber Foods case was that there had never been any 
allegation or finding that the protective gear had been 
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unavailable to the employees when they finally arrived at the 
front of the waiting line? 8 Although the court rejected the 
applicability of §790.7(h), it did find §790.7(g) to be pertinent. 
Under this section, the Secretary of Labor characterized as 
"preliminary," and noncompensable, the time that an employee 
waited to check in or to receive a paycheck. The court 
concluded that these kinds of collateral activities, which are 
similar to the collateral activity of waiting to collect required 
gear, are only compensable if they are covered by an 
agreement of the parties or by the custom or practice of a 
particular industry. 
V. 
The Supreme Court's decision in the consolidated IBP and 
Barber Foods case was the not one of the big decisions of the 
first year of the new Roberts' court. Nor was it a landmark 
employment law case. Instead, the unanimous decision 
demonstrated an affirmation by the court of key understandings 
of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act. There were no 
conceptual changes to the meaning of the words "work," 
"workweek," and "continuous workday." "Preliminary and 
postliminary" activities were still found to be distinct from 
"preparatory and concluding" activities. The characterization 
of preparatory and concluding activities as "integral and 
indispensable" to the principal activity still resulted in 
increasing the length of the compensable day. Walking time 
was found to be compensable while waiting time was not. In 
each instance, the court balanced the statutes, the 
administrative agency regulations, and past judicial decisions 
in order to arrive at a decision that was balanced. 
ENDNOTES 
2007 I IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 74 
29 u.s.c. §§ 251-262. 
2 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219. 
3 546 U.S. 21; 126 S.Ct. 514 (2005). 
4 29 U.S.C. § 202 (a). 
5 29 U.S.C. §206(a)(1). 
6 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). 
7 321 u.s. 590; 64 S.Ct. 698 (1944). The Court held that iron ore miners 
were entitled to compensation for the time spent underground as they 
traveled to and from the "working face of the mines." Although the travel 
time might have been considered non-productive in strict sense, the 
Court concluded that it constituted a "process or occupatiOn necessary . · . 
to production" within the meaning of the FLSA. 
8 Jd. at 598. 
9 323 u.S. 126; 65 S.Ct. 165 (1944). 1n this case, auxiliary 
claimed compensation for the time that they were required to remam m the 
fire hall at the end of their regular day-shift in order to respond to fire-
alarms, make any temporary repairs of fire and take care of the 
sprinkler system if it was defective or set off by m1stak_e. In. fact, much of 
that time was idle time. The Court held that the 1dle time could be 
compensable if it was spent predominately for the employer's benefit and 
not for the employee's. Such a determination could only be made after a 
review of all the circumstances of the case. 
10 !d. at 133. 
11 328 u.S. 680; 66 S.Ct. 1187 (1946). The employees in this case 
in a pottery plant. At the beginning and end of each day, they were reqmred 
to punch time clocks that were located _at the of the plant. W 
could punch in during a 14 minute penod of time the regular sta:tmg 
time for productive work and could punch out dunng another 
period of time at quitting time. 200 were punchmg m and 
out at the same time, a minimum of e1ght mmutes was usually needed to get 
75 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
by the time clock. The estimated walking time between the time clocks and 
work places would range between 30 seconds and three minutes. !d. at 683. 
The employees' compensation was not based on the actual times that 
they punched in or out but from the next even quarter hour after punching in 
until the next even quarter hour prior to punching out. That meant that an 
employee, who punched in for work at 6:46 a.m., punched out and in for 
lunch at 12:14 p.m. and 12:46, and finally punched out for the day at 4:14 
p.m., would be paid for an eight hour day even though the worker's actual 
time on the work site would include 56 additional minutes. !d. at 683-684. 
12 !d. at 690-691. 
13 These activities included putting on aprons and overalls, removing shirts, 
taping or greasing arms, putting on finger cots, preparing the equipment for 
productive work, turning on switches for lights and machinery, opening 
windows, and assembling and sharpening tools. The Court also held that 
compensation could be denied, under the de minimus rule, for work that 
involved insubstantial or insignificant periods of time. 
14 29 U.S.C. §25l(a). 
15 Section 2 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §252), (hereinafter referred to as §2), 
states that: 
"(a) No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the 
Fair Labor Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-
Davis Act (in any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or after 
the date of the enactment of this Act [May 14, 1947], on account of the 
failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an 
employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any activity of an 
employee engaged in prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, except 
an activity which was compensable by either-
"( 1) an express provision of a written or non written contract in effect, at the 
time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-
bargaining representative and his employer; or 
"(2) a custom, practice in effect, at the time of such act1v1ty, at the 
establishment or other place where such employee was employed, covering 
such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in 
2007 I IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 76 
effect at the time of such activity, between such employer, his agent, or 
collective-bargaining representative and his employer." 
16 Section 4 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §254), (and hereinafter referred to as §4) 
states that: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to 
any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act, on account of the 
failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay. an 
employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the followmg 
activities of such employee engaged in on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act-
"(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place 
performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee IS 
employed to perform, and 
"(2) activities which are preliminary to or to said 
activity or activities, which occur either prior to the lime on any 
workday at which such employee commences, or to the on 
any particular workday at which he ceases, such pnnc1pal actiVIty or 
activities. 
"(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) which an 
employer from liability and punishment with respect to an activity, the 
employer shall not be so relieved if such activity is compensable by 
either-
"( 1) an express provision of a written or non written contract in effect, at. the 
time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-
bargaining representative and his employer; or 
"(2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at 
establishment or other place where such employee is employed, covenng 
such activity, ot inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in 
at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-
bargaining representative and his employer." 
17 29 C.F.R. §790.6(a) provides that: "Section 4 of the Portal Act does not 
affect the computation of hours worked within the 'workday' proper, 
77 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
roughly described as the period 'from whistle to whistle,' and its provisions 
have nothing to do with the compensability under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of any activities engaged in by the employee during that period. Under 
the provisions of section 4, one of the conditions that must be present before 
' preliminary' or 'postliminary' activities are excluded from hours worked is 
that they 'occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which 
the employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular 
workday at which he ceases' the principal activity or activities which he is 
employed to perform. Accordingly, to the extent that activities engaged in 
by an employee occur after the employee commences to perfom the first 
principal activity on a particular workday and before he ceases the 
performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, the 
provisions of that section have no application. Periods of time between the 
commencement of the employee's first principal activity and the completion 
of his last principal activity on any workday must be included in the 
computation of hours worked to the same extent as would be required if the 
Portal Act had not been enacted. The principles for determining hours 
worked within the 'workday' proper will continue to be those established 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act without reference to the Portal Act, 
which is concerned with this question only as it relates to time spent outside 
the 'workday' in activities of the kind described in section 4." 
18 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b). 
19 350 U.S. 247, 76 S.Ct. 330 (1956). 
20 !d. at 256. 
21 The Court found the following interchange between Senators Cooper and 
McGarth to be particularly significant on the question of prospective 
liability: 
SENATOR McGRATH: " I think that at this point we might very definitely 
make contribution to the legislative history of what we are doing here. Am 
I correct in understanding the Senator to say that what the majority of the 
committee proposes is that any activity of a worker shall be considered a 
part of his principal activity if the doing of that act is indispensable to the 
performance of the rest of his day's work?" 
SENATOR COOPER: "I can read the language used in the report, and I 
think that language should be used in this connection, because the words 
2007 IIBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 78 
and phrases it employs were adopted by the committee. On page 48 of the 
report, in the definition of 'principal activity,' we fmd these words: 
'"It will be observed that the particular time at which the employee 
commences his principal activity or activities and ceases his principal 
activity or activities marked the beginning and the end of his workday. The 
term "principal activity or activities" includes all activities which are an 
integral part thereof as illustrated by the following examples: 
"' 1. In connection with the operation of a lathe an employee will frequently 
at the commencement of his workday oil, grease, or clean his machine, or 
install a new cutting tool. Such activities are an integral part of the 
principal activity, and are included within such term. 
'"2. In the case of a garment worker in a textile mill, who is required to 
report 30 minutes before other employees report to commence their 
principal activities, and who during such 30 minutes distributes or 
parts of clothing at the workbenches of other employees and gets machmes 
in readiness for operation by other employees, such activities are among the 
principal activities of such employee."' 
"We believe that our bill provides that the employee must receive 
compensation for such activities." 
SENATOR McGRATH: "Then we can clear that point up by reiterating 
that what the committee means is that any amount of time spent in the 
performance of the type of activity expressed in examples 1 and 2 is to be 
hereafter regarded as compensable time." 
SENATOR COOPER: "I should certainly say so, as a part of the principal 
activity." . 
SENATOR McGRATH: "There are innumerable instances of operations 
which have to be performed that are not covered in these particular 
examples. I think of one at the moment. In certain of our chemical plants 
workers are required to put on special clothing and to take off their clothing 
at the end of the workday, and in some of the plants they are required to 
take shower baths before they leave. Does the Senator regard such activity 
as that as coming within the compensable workday?" 
SENATOR COOPER: "I am very happy that the Senator has asked the 
question, because I believe it gives the opportunity of drawing a fine 
79/ Vol. 18/ North East Journal of Legal Studies 
distinction between the type of activity which we consider compensable and 
the type which should not be compensable. In accordance with our 
intention as to the definition of 'principal activity,' if the employee could 
not perform his activity without putting on certain clothes, then the time 
used in changing into those clothes would be compensable as part of his 
principal activity. One the other hand, if changing clothes were merely a 
convenience to the employee and not directly related to the specific work, it 
would not be considered a part of his principal activity, and it follows that 
such time would not be compensable." ( 93 Cong. Rec. 2297-2298.) Id. at 
257-258; 336-337. 
22 Id. at 255. 
23 Supra, n. 3, at 521-522. 
24 Alvarez v. IBP, 339 F.3d 894, 898 (91h Cir., 2003). 
25 Jd. at 899-900. 
26 Abbe/a Tum, eta/., v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d I, 2-3 (1" Cir., 
2003). 
27 The rotating associates were also required to wear safety glasses. The 
glasses and other non-mandatory items such as gloves, aprons, and sleeve 
covers could be donned and doffed after punching in and before punching 
out. Id. at 3. 
28 The meatroom associates were also required to wear vinyl gloves, and 
aprons. These and other non-mandatory items such as sleeve covers could 
be donned and doffed after punching in and before punching out. Id. at 4. 
29 Id. at 3-4. 
30 Lab coats and cotton glove liners could be found on hanger racks and in 
tubs in the hallway between the entranceway and the equipment cage. 
Haimets and earplugs aprons had to be obtained at the window of the 
equipment cage. Vinyl gloves, sleeve covers, and aprons were available at 
the window of the equipment cage or from tubs on the production floor. !d. 
at 4-5 . 
2007 I JBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 80 
31 Rotating associates, set-up operators, and meatroom employees punched 
in at a clock near where they work and punched out on clocks next to the 
two primary exits. Maintenance workers punched in on a clock in the 
maintenance room. Shipping-and-receiving workers used a clock next to 
the shipping-and-receiving office to punch in and out. Sanitation workers 
punched in on the cafeteria clock and out on the plant office clock. Id. at 5-
6. 
32 Alvarez v. IBP. Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25344 (E.D. Wash., Sept. 
14, 2001). 
33 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc, 339 F.3d 894 (91h Cir., 2003). The opinion of the 
court was delivered by Judge Sidney R. Thomas. 
34 The Circuit Court applied the Supreme Court's definition of "work" in 
the Muscoda case and held that since the donning and doffing had been 
"pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer," it 
constituted work. Id. at 902 (citing, supra, note 7, at 598.) 
35 Jd. at 902-903. 
36 Id. at 903. 
37 Id. at 903. The Circuit Court cited Supreme Court's decision in 
Anderson: "When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or 
minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be 
disregarded. Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities or 
working conditions or by the policy of the [FLSA]." Supra, n. 11 , at 692. 
38 Supra, n. 33, at 904. 
39 29 C.F.R. §1910.1030(b) states that: "Personal protective is 
specialized clothing or equipment worn by an for prot.ectwn 
against a hazard. General work clothes (e.g. umforms, pants, shtrts or 
blouses) not intended to function as protection against a hazard are not 
considered to be personal protective equipment." 
40 Supra, n. 33, at 905. 
41 Id. at 906. 
81 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
42 Abdela Tum, et al., v. Barber Foods, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1064 
(D.Me., Jan. 23, 2002). 
43 Supra, n. 3, at 526 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. in 04-66, pp. 36a-40a.). 
44 Id. at 526 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 33a.) 
45 Id. at 526 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 33a-34a.) 
46 Id. at 526. 
47 The jury found that the combined donning and doffing time for rotating 
associates had been 1 minute, for set-up operators 2 minutes 16 seconds, for 
meatroom associates 1 minute 53 seconds, for shipping and receiving 
associates 2 minutes 8 seconds, and for maintenance and sanitation workers 
no minutes since they had not been required to don and doff clothing before 
punching in and punching out. 
48 331 F.3d 1 (l't Cir, 2003). 
49 Id. at 6. 
50 Id. at 6. 
51 Id. at 6. The court found it nonsensical that the employees had conceded 
that the time needed to walk to the place where first piece of mandatory 
gear had been collected was not compensable and still have claimed that 
they should be compensated for the time it took them to pick up their gear 
from two bins instead of one bin. 
52 Id. at 7 (citing 29 C.F.R. §790.7(d)). 
53 ld. at 7. 
54 The Code would have allowed compensation for preliminary activities 
such as the time loggers spend taking carry heavy equipment out to a 
logging site and the time butchers spend sharpening knives. The court, 
however, found that there was a significant difference between those types 
of activities and the waiting time claimed by the Barber employees. It 
concluded that it had to draw a line in this case "otherwise an almost 
2007 I IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez I 82 
endless number of activities that precipitate the employee's essential tasks 
would be compensable." Jd. at 7-8. 
55 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir., 2004). Judge Torruella, the author of the original 
three-judge panel's opinion, presented the opinion of the appellate court 
after the rehearing. 
56 The court rejected the Labor Secretary's suggestion that the ordinary 
"workday" rule should be expanded " in favor of a broader, automatic rule 
that any activity that satisfies the "integral and indispensable" test itself 
starts the workday, regardless of context." I d. at 280. 
57 Jd. at 281-282 
58 In a concurring opinion, Judge Boudin found in favor of the employer 
both with regard to the de minimis time spent donning and doffing required 
gear and the more extensive time spent in walking and waiting. He reached 
this similar conclusion after examining the history and underlying tensions 
that were presented in the legislative history of the FLSA and the Portal-to-
Portal Act, in the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents in the area, and in 
contractions between the regulations of the Labor Department and 
contradictory recommendations of the Labor Secretary. 
59 Supra, n. 3, at 520. 
60 /d. at 520. 
61 Jd. at 520. 29 C.F.R. §790.6(a) states that: 'That to the extent that 
activities engaged in by the employee occur after the employee commences 
to perform the first principal activity on a particular workday and before he 
ceases the performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, 
the provisions of [§4] have no application." 
62 Jd. at 520-521. 
63 ld. at 521. 
64 Even if IBP had entertained hopes that the decision in Steiner might be 
overruled, it became clear during oral arguments that that was not going to 
occur. Justice Stevens confirmed that belief in his opinion when he wrote 
"considerations of stare decisis are particularly forceful in the area of 
83 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
statutory construction, especially when a unanimous interpretation of a 
statute has been accepted as settled law for several decades." Jd. at 523. 
65 Id. at 523, citing Steiner, supra, note 19, at 253. 
66 Jd. at 523, citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,484 (1990). 
67 ld. at 523-524 .. 
68 ld. at 524. 
69 ld. at 524. 
70 §790.7(c) states that the Portal-to-Portal Act does not affect the 
compensabiltiy of time spent traveling from the place of performance of one 
principle activity to that of another. §785.38 states that "where an 
employee is required to report at a meeting place to receive instructions or 
to perform other work there, or to pick up and to carry tools, the travel from 
the designated place to the work place is part of the day's work and must be 
counted as hours worked [under the FLSA.]" 
71 Jd. at 524. 
72 Footnote 49 states that: "Washing up after work, like the changing of 
clothes, may in certain situations be so directly related to the specific work 
the employee is employed to perform that it would be regarded as an 
integral part of the employee's ' principal activity.' This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that travel between the washroom or clothes-
changing place and the actual place of performance of the specific work the 
employee is employed to perform, would be excluded from the type of 
travel to which section 4(a) refers." (Emphasis added.) 
73 Supra, n. 3, at 525. 
74 The Supreme Court noted that since it had already addressed the issue of 
the compensability for the time spent walking between the location where 
the gear was donned and doffed in favor of the employees, it only needed to 
consider the compensability for the pre-donning waiting time. Supra, n. 3, 
at 527. 
75 Id. at 527. 
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76 I d. at 527. 
77 In this case, the waiting time was two steps removed from the productive 
activity on the assembly line and is therefore not "integral and 
indispensable" to a "principal activity." 
78 I d. at 527. 
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Assume a faculty member at a public college is 
reprimanded by her department chair for the following reasons: 
she is told that her explanations to her students are unclear. In 
a recent class she taught, she gave 13 incompletes. When 
students approach her about making up the incomplete, she 
does not explain how to successfully complete the course. The 
students complain to her chair and she is given a reprimand and 
eventually not re-hired. 
The faculty member sues the college. She alleges 
infringement of her rights to free speech and academic freedom 
"in retaliation for her refusal to comply with a request that she 
communicate more clearly to her students what was required to 
complete the coursework in a class she taught in the fall of 
2000."1 
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